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Abstract
Recently, Halpern and Pearl proposed a deﬁnition of actual
cause within the framework of structural models. In this pa-
per, we explicate some of the assumptions underlying their
deﬁnition, and re-evaluate the effectiveness of their account.
We also brieﬂy contemplate the suitability of structural mod-
els as a language for expressing subtle notions of common-
sense causation.
Introduction
Providing an adequate deﬁnition for when one event causes
another has been a troublesome issue in philosophy for cen-
turies (Sosa & Tooley 1993). To partially illustrate the difﬁ-
culties involved, consider the following example:
Example (Firing Squad) Therea r et w or iﬂemen (
￿
￿ and
￿
￿)i naﬁ r i n gs quad. On their captain’s order, they both
shoot simultaneously and accurately. The prisoner dies.
From this story, we can ask causal queries such as: did
￿
￿’s shot cause the prisoner’s death? We can also ask
whether the captain’s order caused the prisoner’s death. For
both of these queries, a satisfactory account of causation
should answer “yes,” to agree with our intuition. Most ac-
counts attempt to capture the concept of causation by con-
sidering sufﬁciency of the candidate cause, necessity of the
candidate cause, or some hybrid of the two. For instance,
the captain’s orderi sboth necessary and sufﬁcient for the
prisoner’s death (given that we assume the riﬂemen always
obey the captain’s order). Alternatively,
￿
￿’s shot is sufﬁ-
cient, but not necessary, for the prisoner’s death to occur.
Additionally, it is possible to derive candidates that are suf-
ﬁcient for the effect, but that we would not consider causes.
In a recent paper (Halpern & Pearl 2001), Halpern and
Pearl propose a deﬁnition of cause (which they term actual
cause)w ithin the framework of structural causal models.
Speciﬁcally,theyexpressstories asa structuralcausal model
(or more accurately, a causal world), and then provide a def-
inition for when one event causes another, given this model
of the story. Their deﬁnition is primarily necessity–based.
The main idea is that a candidate
￿ is an actual cause of an
effect
￿ when
￿ and
￿ have both occurred, and there exists
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somecounterfactualcontingency
￿ underwhich
￿ is coun-
terfactually dependent on
￿.B yt h i s ,w emean that had
￿
occurred,
￿ and
￿ woulds till have occurred, but
￿ would
not have occurred were it not for
￿.F o r i n s t a n ce, in the
above example, the prisoner’s death is counterfactually de-
pendent on
￿
￿’s shot, under the counterfactual contingency
that
￿
￿ did not shoot his riﬂe. Halpern and Pearl impose a
few restrictions such that not every contingency
￿ can be
considered (we discuss this in greater detail in the next sec-
tion).
In this paper, we make the following contributions:
1. We explicate some of assumptions underlying the usage
of causal models for the commonsense causal reason-
ing addressed by Halpern and Pearl in (Halpern & Pearl
2001). Halpern and Pearl do not elaborate on how stories
are mapped into appropriate causal models; rather, they
simply use models that “seem right.” Spelling out the for-
malimplicationsofa givencausalmodelisespeciallycru-
cial in light of the fact that different (seemingly sensible)
models of the same story can yield different answers for
identical queries. This analysis also helps us to determine
what problem Halpern and Pearl are actually addressing
with their deﬁnition. Namely, what kind of information
doest heir deﬁnition assume is encoded in the model? On
what basis do their conclusions about causation rest?
2. We evaluate the counterfactual strategy that provides the
foundation for Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition. We pro-
vide evidence that this strategy (despite the attempts at
restricting viable counterfactual contingencies) is far too
permissive.
3. After highlighting some problematic aspects of Halpern
and Pearl’s account, we brieﬂy address whether this is at-
tributable to the framework in which it is based: the lan-
guage of structural models. Essentially a propositional
language, we consider whether the ontological commit-
ment of this framework limits the ability to effectively
capturenotionsthatare essentialto avalidaccountofcau-
sation.
Structural Models and a Deﬁnition of Cause
Halpernand Pearl deﬁne their notionof causation within the
languageof structuralmodels. Essentially,structuralmodels
are a system of equationsovera set of randomvariables. We
From: AAAI Technical Report SS-03-05. Compilation copyright © 2003, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. Figure 1: Causal model for the Firing Squad scenario. All
variables are propositional.
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can divide the variables into two sets: endogenous (each of
which have exactly one structural equation that determines
their value) and exogenous(whose valuesare determinedby
factors outside the model, and thus have no corresponding
equation).
First we establish some preliminaries. We will generally
use upper-case letters (e.g.
￿,
￿ )t or epresent random vari-
ables, and the lower-case correspondent (e.g.
￿,
￿)t or e p r e -
sent a particularvalueofthatv ariable.
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ will denote
the domain of a random variable
￿.W ew ill use bold-face
upper-caseletters to representa set of randomvariables(e.g.
￿,
￿). The lower-case correspondent (e.g.
￿,
￿)w ill repre-
sent a value assignment for the correspondingset.
Formally, a structural causal model (or causal model)i s
at r i p l e
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,i nw h i c h
￿ is aﬁ nite set of exogenous
random variables,
￿ is aﬁ nite set of endogenous random
variables (disjoint from
￿), and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ where
￿
￿ is a function
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ that assigns a value
to
￿ for each setting of the remainingvariables in the model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.F or each
￿,w ecan deﬁne
￿
￿
￿,t h e
parentset of
￿,t ob et h es e to fv ariablesin
￿ that can affect
the value of
￿ (i.e. are non-trivial in
￿
￿). We also assume
that the domains of the random variables are ﬁnite.
Causal models can be depicted as a causal diagram,a
directed graph whose nodes correspond to the variables in
￿
￿
￿ with an edge from
￿ to
￿
￿
￿ iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Example In Figure 1, we see the ﬁring squad scenario ex-
pressed as a causal model. Here,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.A ll variables are propositional, with value
1i ndicating a true proposition, andv alue 0 indicating that
the proposition is false (this will be the convention for most
causal models given as examples in this paper).
If we assume a particular value for the exogenous vari-
ables
￿ (referred to as a context), then the resulting causal
model is called a causal world.W e g e n erally assume that
any particular value for
￿ uniquely determines the values
of the variables in
￿.T h i sa l w a y sh appens when the causal
diagramis acyclic (such causal modelsare called recursive).
Causal worlds are of interest since they represent a speciﬁc
situation, while causal models represent a more general sce-
nario. For instance, if we assume that
￿
￿
￿
￿ in our ﬁr-
ing squad causal model, then the resulting causal world de-
scribes our story (given in the introduction). The more gen-
eral model allows for the situation in which the captain does
not signal.
To handle counterfactual queries, we deﬁne the concept
of submodels.G i v e n a causal model
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,t h esubmodel of
￿ under inter-
vention
￿
￿
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿ =
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e r e
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I n t uitively, the submodel
ﬁxes the values of the variables in
￿ at
￿ (i.e, their values
are no longer determined by their parents’ values). Conse-
quently,the valuesofthe remainingvariablesrepresentwhat
values they would have had if
￿ had been
￿ in the original
model.
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿ are typically abbreviated
￿
￿ and
￿
￿.T h ev a l u eo fv a r i a b l e
￿
￿
￿ in submodel
￿
￿ (under
context
￿)i sr e p r e sented as
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ (or simply
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿).
Example (interventions) Consider the ﬁring squad causal
model under context
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and the question:
would the prisoner be dead if we make sure that
￿
￿ does not
ﬁreh is gun? This corresponds to evaluating
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I n
this case, the captain still signals, so riﬂeman 2 still shoots.
Thus
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,a nd we concludethat the prisoner still
dies in this counterfactual scenario.
Equipped with this background, we can now proceed to
Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition of actual cause:
Deﬁnition 1 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ be a causal model. Let
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿.
￿
￿
￿ is an actual cause of
￿
￿
￿
(denoted
￿
￿
￿)i nac ausal world
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ if the following
three conditions hold:
(AC1)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
(AC2)There exists
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ andvalues
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that:
(a)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
(b)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
(c)
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,f o rall
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that
￿ =
￿
￿
￿
￿.
(AC3)
￿ is minimal; no subset of
￿ satisﬁes conditions
AC1 and AC2.
Intuitively,
￿ is an actual cause of
￿ if (AC1)
￿ and
￿ are
the “actual values” of
￿ and
￿ (i.e. the values of
￿ and
￿
under no intervention), and (AC2) under some counterfac-
tual contingency
￿,t h ev a l u eo f
￿ is dependenton
￿,s u c h
that setting
￿ to its actual value will ensure that
￿ main-
tains its “actual value,” even if we force all other variables
in the model back to their “actual values.” (AC3) is a simple
minimality condition.
Example In the ﬁring squad example, we see that
￿
￿
￿
￿ (the ﬁrst riﬂeman’s shot) is indeed an actual cause of
￿
￿
￿ (death), since [AC1]
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
[AC2(a)]
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,[ A C 2 ( b)]
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,a n d[ A C2(c)]
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.H e r e, our
￿ is
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
One useful theorem (provenb y( E iter & Lukasiewicz
2001)and(Hopkins2002))demonstratesthattheminimality
condition of the deﬁnition forces every actual cause to be an
event over a single random variable (also called a primitive
event).Theorem 2 Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ be a causal model. Let
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.I f
￿
￿
￿
under
￿,t h e n
￿ is a singleton.
Explicating Assumptions
In the next two sections, we will attempt to answer the fol-
lowing question: what information does a causal world en-
code? Speciﬁcally, what information are we using when we
decide that event
￿ causes event
￿,g i v e nacausal world?
HalpernandPearl(Halpern&Pearl2001)givesuggestive
comments that help illuminate the path, but stop short of
providing details:
It may seem strange that we are trying to understand
causality using causal models, which clearly already
encode causal relationships. Our reasoning is not cir-
cular. Our aim is not to reduce causation to noncausal
concepts, but to interpret questions about causes of
speciﬁc events in fully speciﬁed scenarios in terms of
generic causal knowledge such as what we obtain from
thee quations of physics.
Essentially, a causal world encodes information from two
sources:
1. The choice of endogenous variables
￿.
2. The set of structural equations over
￿.
The latter item, the set of structural equations, gives us
all counterfactual information regarding the variables of in-
terest (i.e. the endogenous variables of the causal world).
With it, we can answer any question of the form: “If
￿ had
been
￿,w h a tw ould the value of
￿ have been?” Clearly,
this counterfactual information is a cornerstone of Halpern
and Pearl’s deﬁnition. Furthermore, given a set of endoge-
nous variables and a story, it is generally straightforward to
formulate the appropriate structural equations.
Nevertheless, to answer questionsof the form: “Did event
￿
￿
￿ cause event
￿
￿
￿?”, we need more information
than simply a set of structural equations over
￿,
￿ ,a n da n
arbitraryset of othervariables. To take an example,consider
thef ollowing story, taken from (Halpern & Pearl 2000):
Example (Rock) Billy and Suzy both throw rocks at a bot-
tle. Suzy’s arm is better than Billy’s, so her rock gets to the
bottle ﬁrst and shatters it. Billy’s throw was perfectly accu-
rate, so his rock would have shattered the bottle had Suzy’s
missed.
If we take the set of propositional random variables
￿
￿
(Billy Throws),
￿
￿ (Suzy Throws), and
￿
￿ (Bottle Shat-
tered), we can see that the structural equations over these
threevariablesare equivalenttothe structuralequationsover
￿
￿,
￿
￿,a n d
￿ in the ﬁring squad example. Nevertheless, in
this instance we would like to conclude that
￿
￿
￿
￿is not
a cause of
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e r eas for the isomorphic query “Is
￿
￿
￿
￿a cause of
￿
￿
￿ ?” in the ﬁring squad example, we
would like to conclude the opposite.
Thus we arrive at the second (and murkier) piece of infor-
mation encoded by a causal world – the choice of endoge-
nous variables.
B
C
D B shoots
C loads
and shoots
death of
prisoner
A
A loads
B's gun
Figure 2: Causal diagram for the Loader scenario.
Variable Selection
Halpern and Pearl are well aware of the sensitivity of their
deﬁnition to the choice of endogenous variables for the
causal world. They are vague, however, when it comes to
deﬁning the semantics accorded to a particular choice of
endogenous variables. In this section, we consider what
their deﬁnition of cause assumes about local relationships
between variables. Speciﬁcally, we examine a single vari-
able in the causal world and its parents, and consider when a
parentisconsideredtobeacauseofitschild,undertheirdef-
inition. Givenlocalcriteria, we can thenestablish guidelines
about what constitutes an “incorrect” choice of endogenous
variables.
Consider a variable
￿ , one of its parents
￿,a n dits struc-
tural equation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.S uppose
that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.W ew ant to extract condi-
tions from
￿
￿ that imply that
￿ is a cause of
￿.
To do this, it is convenient to express the set of parent
value assignments
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
as a (propositional) logical sentence (which we will denote
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿) over literals of the form
￿
￿
￿,f o r
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
We illustrate this with a modiﬁed version of the ﬁring
squad example.
Example (Loader)For a ﬁring squad consisting of shooters
￿ and
￿,i ti s
￿’s job tol o a d
￿’s gun.
￿ loads and ﬁres his
own gun. On a given day,
￿ loads
￿’s gun. When the time
comes,
￿ and
￿ shoot the prisoner.
Suppose we choose to model this as a causal world
(whose causal diagram is pictured in Figure 2) over the fol-
lowing four propositional random variables:
￿ (true iff A
loads B’s gun),
￿ (true iff B shoots)
￿ (true iff C loads and
shoots), and
￿ (true iff the prisoner dies).
In the model,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,s oc onsider the set of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .W ec a ne xpress this as
the following logical sentence:
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,w here each conjunct is a full instantiation
￿ of
the parents of
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
More interesting is the prime implicant form of this sen-
tence. Recall that an implicant of a sentence
￿ is a term
(conjunction of literals) that entails
￿.A p r i m e i mplicantof
￿ is an implicant of
￿ that does not entail any other im-
plicant of
￿ (besides itself). The prime implicant form of
as e n t e n c ei st he disjunction of all of its prime implicants.
Note that this form is unique.
To continue our example, the prime implicant form of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .O b s e r ve that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
which are both implicants of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , both entail impli-
cant
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,t hus they do not appear in the prime
implicant form.
The prime implicant form isi nteresting because it lends
itself to a natural causal interpretation. Each prime impli-
cant is a minimal set of value assignments to parents of
￿
￿
that ensures that
￿
￿
￿
￿ .S p eciﬁcally in this example, the
prisoner will be guaranteed to die if
￿ loads
￿’s gun and
￿
shoots, or alternatively, if
￿ loads and shoots.
This logical form is reminiscent of the causal criterion
laid out by John Mackie called the INUS condition (Mackie
1965). Consider an event
￿ and an effect
￿.R a t h e rt h a n
requiring that
￿ is either necessary or sufﬁcient (or both) to
achieve
￿,M ackie instead requires that
￿ is an insufﬁcient
but necessary part of ac ondition which is itself unneces-
sary but sufﬁcient for the result. For instance,
￿ loading
￿’s
gun is a necessary part of a sufﬁcient condition to ensure
the prisoner’s death. In terms of the prime implicant logical
form, sufﬁcient conditions map to implicants. For instance,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿is a sufﬁcient condition for
￿
￿
￿ .F u r t h e r -
more, since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿is a prime implicate (hence no
subset of its conjuncts is an implicate), we observe that both
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿are necessary parts of this sufﬁcient con-
dition. Hence any literal that appears in a prime implicate
satisﬁes the INUS condition.
Interestingly, we can prove the following:
Theorem 3 Consider a variable
￿ , one of its parents
￿,
and its structural equation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Suppose that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.T h e n i f
￿
￿
￿
appears as an literal in any prime implicate of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
then
￿ causes
￿ accordingto Halpern andPearl’s deﬁnition.
Proof Clearly AC1 holds, since
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Furthermore AC3 holds trivially. It remains to show AC2
holds. We will prove an equivalent contrapositive. Specif-
ically, we will suppose that AC2 does not hold, and prove
that under this supposition,
￿
￿
￿ cannot appear as a literal
in any prime implicate of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.
Suppose, then, that AC2 does not hold. This implies
that for the set of parents of
￿ not including
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,t h e r ei sno instantiation
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such
that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.H e n ce for
any implicate of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ of the form
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,w h e r e
￿ is a conjunctionof literals,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is also an impli-
cate, for every
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.H e n ce
￿ is also an implicate,
which meansthat anyimplicatecontainingthe literal
￿
￿
￿
is not prime.
The implications of the above theorem are surprising. It
is encouraging that locally speaking, Halpern and Pearl’s
deﬁnition resembles the intuitively appealing criterion of
Mackie. At the same time, the theorem exposes the over-
permissiveness of Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition. Observe
that for
￿ to cause
￿,
￿
￿
￿ need only appear in some
prime implicate of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.T h e r ei sno requirement for
￿
￿
￿ to appearin a satisﬁed primeimplicate. Consider the
following alteration of the loader example for emphasis.
Example We have the same situation as in the Loader ex-
ample above, except now
￿ elects not to shoot.
￿ still loads
￿’s gun,
￿ still loads and shoots, and the prisoner still dies.
This story can be modeled the same way as above (see
Figure 2), except now
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .T h eprime implicate form
of
￿
￿
￿is still
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .N o tice that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿and that
￿
￿
￿appears in
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,h e n ce by
Theorem 3, Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition classiﬁes
￿
￿
￿
as a cause of
￿
￿
￿ .( a lternatively, we can observe that the
intervention
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿satisﬁes AC2 of their deﬁnition).
Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition classiﬁes
￿ loading
￿’s
gun as a cause of the prisoner’s death because it is a nec-
essary part of a sufﬁcient condition to cause the prisoner’s
death, but it completely disregards the fact that this sufﬁ-
cient condition did not occur in the actual situation we are
concerned with! This is what prompts the deﬁnition to draw
such a counterintuitive conclusion. Given this observation,
it is trivial to construct any number of situations for which
Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition returns an answer contrary to
intuition.
In fact, locally speaking, Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition is
evenmorepermissivethan Theorem3 suggests. The follow-
ingc ounterexample demonstrates that the converse of The-
orem 3 does not hold.
Example Suppose we have a causal world with three ran-
dom variables
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿.D e ﬁ n e t h e s tructural
equations such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ and sucht h a t
￿
￿
￿
iff
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿(notethatthisis
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ). In
the actual world, let
￿
￿
￿(hence
￿
￿
￿and
￿
￿
￿ ). Ac-
cording to Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition,
￿
￿
￿is a cause
of
￿
￿
￿(letting
￿
￿
￿). Observe that
￿
￿
￿ does not
appear as a conjunct of any prime implicate of
￿
￿
￿ .
Counterexamples can also be constructed for the case
where all variables are restricted to be propositional.
These observations shed light on what is considered to
be an appropriate choice of endogenous variables, under
Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition. Namely, the variables must
be chosen in such a way that the structural equations have a
strong causal semantics.B yt h i s ,w emean that every prime
implicate for event
￿
￿
￿ must unconditionally be a cause
of
￿
￿
￿.O b s e r v et h at every term of a satisﬁed prime im-
plicate of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ will be considered to be a cause of
￿
￿
￿,r e g a r d l ess of the values of the other variables in
the model. Often, structural equations do not possess these
strong causals e m antics.
As one example, we can revisitt h eR o c ks t ory. Here we
observethatalthough
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ,
it is not the case that
￿
￿
￿
￿is unconditionally a cause of
￿
￿
￿
￿,s i n c e
￿
￿
￿
￿ is not a cause of
￿
￿
￿
￿ in the
event that
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
An alternative selection of variables for the Rock story
adds two additional variables to our previous choice: SHST
BH
BS
Suzy throws
her rock
Billy hits
the bottle
bottle
shatters
SH
Suzy hits
the bottle
BT
Billy throws
his rock
BT
BS
Billy throws
his rock
bottle
shatters
ST
Suzy throws
her rock
Figure 3: Causal diagrams for two formulations of the Rock
scenario.
(Suzy Hits), which is true if and only if Suzy’s rock hits
the bottle, and BH (Billy Hits), which is analogous. The
causal diagram for this alternatev a r i a b l ec hoice is depicted
in Figure 3. In their paper, Halpern and Pearl consider both
of these models, and reject the former because it does not
carry all the information from the story. Notably, the latter
is the only one which strong causal semantics. Speciﬁcally,
notice that if either Billy’s rock hits the bottle or if Suzy’s
rock hits the bottle, then both are causes of the shattering,
no matter what the values of the other variablesin the model
happen to be.
From this perspective, Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition can
be viewed as a means of extracting more complex causal
relationships from simple causal relationships. The implicit
assumption is that every local interaction is causal (in the
strong sense expressed above), and given this, the problem
is to extract causal relationships between events that are not
directly linked.
The Counterfactual Strategy
We nowturnourattentionto thecounterfactualstrategyused
by Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition and evaluate its validity.
Afuzzywaytodeﬁnecausality(Yablo2000)betweentwo
events is to say: event
￿ causes event
￿ iff for some appro-
priate
￿,
￿ is counterfactually dependent on
￿ when we
hold
￿ ﬁxed. Here,
￿ is any imaginable statement aboutthe
world. For instance, in the Rock story, if we hold ﬁxed that
Billy does not throw his rock, then the bottle being shattered
is counterfactually dependenton Suzy throwing her rock.
As an example of ani n a ppropriate
￿,c onsider the fact
that the occurrenceof a full moonis counterfactuallydepen-
dent on whether you brushed your teeth this morning if we
holdit ﬁxed thataf u l lm oon occursonly if you brushed your
teeth thism o r ning.T oc onsider a less trivial example, in the
Suzy-Billy story, the bottle being shattered is counterfactu-
allydependentonBillythrowinghisrock,giventhatwehold
ﬁxed that Suzy does not throw her rock (still we should not
conclude that Billy’s throw causes the bottle to shatter).
Thus the key element of any counterfactual strategy is
how it identiﬁes which
￿ are appropriate to hold ﬁxed. In-
tuitively, we would like to screen out the other causes of
￿,
such that the only causal mechanism responsible for
￿ is
￿.
Unfortunately, issues such as preemption make it extremely
difﬁcult to systematically deﬁne which choices of
￿ are ap-
propriate.
In Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition, they essentially allow
￿ to be anything that can be expressed as a conjunction of
primitiveeventsinvolvingany endogenousvariablewhich is
neither a cause nor an effect variable. Naturally, this deﬁni-
tion is too permissive (basically it allows for any imaginable
￿,g iven a suitable choice of endogenous variables), thus
they make an effort (through AC2(c)) to restrict the permis-
siveness of the deﬁnition. Unfortunately, this restriction has
twod efects. Firstly, it is non-intuitive. Secondly, it is not
restrictive enough.
ThispermissivenesswaspointedoutbyHalpernandPearl
using the following example.
Example (Loanshark) Larry the Loanshark contemplates
lurking outside (
￿
￿)o fF r e d ’ sw orkplace to cut off his
ﬁnger(
￿
￿), as a warning to him to repay his loan quickly.
Something comes up, however, so he does not do so (
￿
￿
￿
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿). That same day, Fred has his ﬁnger sev-
ered (
￿
￿
￿
￿ )b yam achine at the factory. He is rushed to
the hospital, where the ﬁnger is reattached, so if Larry had
shown up, he would have missed Fred. At day’s end, Fred’s
ﬁnger is functional (
￿
￿
￿
￿ ), which would not have been
true had Larry shown up and Fred not had his accident.
In this case, Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition unintuitively
classiﬁes Fred’s accident as a cause of his ﬁnger being func-
tional at day’s end. To remedy this problem, they propose a
scheme wherein “fanciful contigencies” are excluded from
consideration. Thus,giventhattheprioroddsofLarryshow-
ing up are slim, they conclude that Fred’s accident is not a
cause of his ﬁnger’s functionality. Nevertheless, this is a
rather unsatisfactory remedy to the problem. Consider what
happensif the story is amendedsuch that Larry fully intends
to show up at the factory, but is improbably struck by light-
ning such that he doesn’t arrive. Hence the prior probability
of
￿
￿
￿
￿ is high, and yet we still intuitively would like
to conclude that Fred’s accident did not cause his ﬁnger’s
functionality. In fact, we would only want to conclude that
Fred’s accident was a cause of hisﬁ nger being functional at
day’s end in the event that Larry shows up in actuality.
In fact, the problem illustrated by this example is simply
ar e p r e s e n t ative of any number of situations where it is pos-
sible to choose an inappropriate
￿ to keep ﬁxed.
Example (Bomb) Billy puts a bomb under Suzy’s chair.
Later, Suzy notices the bomb and ﬂees the room. Still later,
Suzy has a prearranged medical checkup and is pronounced
healthy (Yablo 2000).Suzy notices
the bomb
The chair
explodes
Suzy is
declared
healthy
Suzy
flees
Billy plants
the bomb
Figure 4: Causal diagram for the Bomb scenario.
Given the causal world (with strong causal semantics)
whose causal diagram is shown in Figure 4, Halpern and
Pearl’s deﬁnition classiﬁesB illy putting the bomb under
Suzy’s chair as a cause of Suzy being pronounced healthy.
Clearly this is an unintuitive result, however if we hold
ﬁxed the fact that Suzy’s chaire xplodes, then Suzy being
pronounced healthy is counterfactually dependent on Billy
plantingthe bomb (otherwise,she would not have any warn-
ing that the chair would explode and would not ﬂee).
The moral of the story is that a deﬁnition of cause based
exclusively on counterfactualcontingenciesmust be consid-
erably less permissive than Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁnition.
Whether it is feasible to propose such a deﬁnition at all in
thes tructural model framework (without being overly re-
strictive) is considered in the next section.
Ontological Concerns
The question remains: although Halpern and Pearl’s deﬁni-
tioni sp roblematic, is it feasible to propose a satisfactory
deﬁnition of cause within the structural model framework?
Consider the following example from Jonathan Schaffer
(Yablo 2000) which parallels the Rock scenario.
Example (Magic) Imagine that it is a law of magic that the
ﬁrst spell cast on a given day matches the enchantment that
midnight. Suppose that at noon Merlin casts a spell (the ﬁrst
that day) to turn the prince into a frog, that at 6pm Morgana
casts a spell (the only other that day) to turn the prince into
a frog, and that at midnight the prince becomes a frog.
Intuitively, Merlin’s spell is a cause of the prince’s trans-
formation and Morgana’s is not. In this case, although there
is preemption,therearenointermediatingeventsthat wecan
really play with and model. Spells work directly, and with-
out Merlin’s spell, the prince’s transformation would have
occurred at precisely the same time and in the same manner.
Hence it is far from clear howw ec ould model this story
appropriately with a structural model. One concise way to
express this story uses ﬁrst-order constructs. For example,
we could neatly express the rule that a spell works iff there
does not exist ap r e v i ous spell cast that day.
Perhaps then, we should be looking beyond the ontologi-
cal commitment of structural models (which essentially are
built on propositional logic) to richer languages in which
subtle points of causality can be more easily expressed. This
is not to say that such a deﬁnition would be impossible
within the structural model framework, but the framework
doess eem to overly limit our ability to do so.
Besides addingﬁrst-order constructs, we could also bene-
ﬁt from adding other features to the structural model frame-
work, described brieﬂy here (for a more detailed discussion,
see( H opkins & Pearl 2002)):
Temporal constructs: Time playsac r itical role in our
perceptions of causality, and yet it has no explicit represen-
tation in structural models. Time can be modeled within
this framework in the similar fashion as dynamic Bayesian
networks, yet this can often lead to counterintuitive conclu-
sions. Itisimportanttodistinguishwhenan eventcausesan-
other event, as opposed to an event hastening another event
(asi nastrong wind that causes Suzy’s rock to hit the bottle
earlier than anticipated, but does not cause the bottle to shat-
ter). It is difﬁcult to phrase this ﬁne distinction within the
structural model framework. (Halpern & Pearl 2000)
Distinction between condition and transition: Con-
sider the difference between an enduringcondition (e.g., the
man is dead) versus a transitional event (e.g., the man dies).
While we may consider a hearta t t ack the cause of a man
dying,we may be reluctant to consider the same heart attack
as the cause of the man being dead in they ear 3000. Such
distinctions can be modeled by adding specialized classes
of random variables to the structural model framework, but
such classes are not part of the framework as it stands.
Distinction between presence and absence of an event:
We often apply stronger criteria when deciding whether the
absence of an event (e.g. a bystander’s inaction) is a cause,
as opposed to the presence of an event (e.g. a riﬂeman’s
shot). The underlying issue here is a matter of production –
thel atter playsan active rolein bringingaboutan effect(e.g.
av i c tim’sdeath),while the formerdoesnot. In thestructural
modelframework(where all eventsare value assignmentsto
random variables), such distinctions are lost. We can regain
suchdistinctionsbyaddingdistinguishedvaluestothestruc-
tural model framework (e.g., giving the value assignment
￿
as p ecial semantics).
Conclusions and Outlook
In this paper, we have attempted to explicate some of the
latent assumptions made in (Halpern & Pearl 2001) and to
evaluate their account of causality on two bases:
1. The effectiveness of their strategy of counterfactual de-
pendence modulo a set of facts which are kept ﬁxed.
2. The suitability of the structural model framework to cap-
ture the subtleties involved in commonsense causation.
In the process, we have highlighted fundamental stum-
bling blocks for their deﬁnition. One of the key resultsof this paper relates their deﬁnition to the prime implicate
form of the structural equations, which lays bare some of
the deﬁnition’s problematic aspects. Furthermore, we have
provided further evidence that the strategy of counterfactual
dependence employed is much too permissive.
The most promising direction for future research seems
to be ﬁnding ways to embed a deﬁnition of actual causation
in ar icher, more expressive language. Ideally, these deﬁ-
nitions would beneﬁt from the positive features of Halpern
and Pearl’s account.
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